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In 1998, the Longford gas plant was owned by a joint partnership between Esso and BHP. Esso was responsible for the operation of the plant. Esso was a wholly owned subsidiary of US based company Exxon, which has since merged with Mobil, becoming ExxonMobil. BHP has since merged with UK based Billiton becoming BHP Billiton.
Built in 1969, the plant at Longford is the onshore receiving point for oil and natural gas output from production platforms in Bass Strait. The Longford Gas Plant Complex consists of three gas processing plants and one crude oil stabilisation plant. It was the primary provider of natural gas to Victoria, and provided some supply to New South Wales.
Built in 1969, the plant at Longford is the onshore receiving point for oil and natural gas output from production platforms in Bass Strait. The Longford Gas Plant Complex consists of three gas processing plants and one crude oil stabilisation plant. It was the primary provider of natural gas to Victoria, and provided some supply to New South Wales.
A Royal Commission was called into the explosion at Longford, headed by former High Court judge Daryl Dawson. The Commission sat for 53 days, commencing with a preliminary hearing on 12 November 1998 and concluding with a closing address by Counsel Assisting the Royal Commission on 15 April 1999.
Esso initially blamed the accident on worker negligence, in particular Jim Ward, one of the panel workers on duty on the day of the explosion.
There is no evidence that Esso blamed the operator.
The findings of the Royal Commission, however, cleared Ward of any negligence or wrong-doing. Instead, the Commission found Esso fully responsible for the accident:
The causes of the accident on 25 September 1998 amounted to a failure to provide and maintain so far as practicable a working environment that was safe and without risks to health. This constituted a breach or breaches of Section 21 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985.
Other findings of the Royal Commission included:
Esso initially blamed the accident on worker negligence, in particular Jim Ward, one of the panel workers on duty on the day of the explosion.
There is no evidence that Esso blamed the operator.
The findings of the Royal Commission, however, cleared Ward of any negligence or wrong-doing. Instead, the Commission found Esso fully responsible for the accident:
The causes of the accident on 25 September 1998 amounted to a failure to provide and maintain so far as practicable a working environment that was safe and without risks to health. This constituted a breach or breaches of Section 21 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985.
Other findings of the Royal Commission included:
- the Longford plant was poorly designed, and made isolation of dangerous vapours and materials very difficult; สาเหตุระบุชัด ออกแบบห่วย!!!
- inadequate training of personnel in normal operating procedures of a hazardous process;
- excessive alarm and warning systems had caused workers to become desensitised to possible hazardous occurrences;
- the relocation of plant engineers to Melbourne had reduced the quality of supervision at the plant;
- poor communication between shifts meant that the pump shutdown was not communicated to the following shift. Certain managerial shortcomings were also identified:
- the company had neglected to commission a HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability) analysis of the heat exchange system, which would almost certainly have highlighted the risk of tank rupture caused by sudden temperature change;
- Esso's two-tiered reporting system (from operators to supervisors to management) meant that certain warning signs such as a previous similar incident (on 28 August) were not reported to the appropriate parties;
- the company's "safety culture" was more oriented towards preventing lost time due to accidents or injuries, rather than protection of workers and their health.
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