วันเสาร์ที่ 13 กุมภาพันธ์ พ.ศ. 2553

กำจัดความเสี่ยง ด้วยการดู Category:Industrial fires and explosions

Category:Industrial fires and explosions

ขณะนี้มีความพยายามจากหลายฝ่ายที่จะให้มีการเปิดทดสอบระบบ โรงงานที่มีความเสี่ยงสูง อยากให้ดูเหตุวิกฤต ของโรงงานต่างๆ ในอดีต เป็นส่วนประกอบในการตัดสินอีกครั้ง !!!
http://plant-explosions-news.newslib.com/ <- ข่าวใหม่ข่าวเก่ารวมไว้ที่นี่

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วันศุกร์ที่ 12 กุมภาพันธ์ พ.ศ. 2553

2008 Toronto propane explosion





2008 Toronto propane explosion
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The explosions seen from midtown Toronto.
Date August 10, 2008 (2008-08-10)
Time 03:50 ET
Location 54 Murray Road North York, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Casualties
The 2008 Toronto propane explosion (also known as the Sunrise Propane incident) was a series of explosions and ensuing fire, that took place on the morning of August 10, 2008 in the Downsview community of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.[1] The explosions happened at the Sunrise Propane Industrial Gases propane facility in the Keele Street and Wilson Avenue area of North York around 03:50 ET.[2] The blasts caused thousands of people to be evacuated from their homes and cost C$1.8 million to clean up, half of which was paid by the province of Ontario.[3][4] An employee of Sunrise died in the initial explosions while a firefighter died of a heart attack the next day while at the scene.[2][5]




History
Sunrise Propane Industrial Gases was a company that sold propane for bulk and home purposes, as well as gases such as helium and acetylene.[6] The company operated under a number of names since at least 1999. In 2002, a company named Sunrise Petroleum was successfully sued by First Choice Petroleum Inc., an oil and lubricants supplier, that claimed the company owed them C$54,063.73 in products and that Sunrise forged a document to get out of settling their account.[7] In that case, it was found that Sunrise had forged the signature of a First Choice employee named Thomas Tims in a 1999 document, which stated Sunrise Petroleum would be taken over by a new company called Sunrise Petroleum Lubricants, and that Sunrise Petroleum would thereby not be responsible for any outstanding, unpaid, or unsettled accounts. However, Tims would not have signed the document because he was listed on it as "Tim Toms," rather than Tom Tims. The result of the case was Sunrise being forced to pay the account owed plus interest, totalling C$93,389.54, and an additional C$34,284.71 in legal fees. Court documents also revealed a third name, Sunrise Propane & Petroleum, that the company had previously used.[7]

An Ontario corporate profile states the facility was incorporated in 2004, though a Sunrise corporate solicitor and spokesperson is uncertain how long the facility was in operation.[7] The facility was built in a residential neighbourhood in the North York area of Toronto. Toronto mayor David Miller stated that the facility was allowed to be built in the neighbourhood under zoning that was in place for over a decade.[8]

The facility had previously been warned by Ontario's Technical Standards and Safety Authority for its lack of safety by not stopping truck-to-truck transfers at the company's facilities. During the investigation following the explosions, investigators found that truck-to-truck transfers were common at the facility. Truck-to-truck transfers are prohibited in Ontario because they increase the risk of a gas leak or a fire.[5]

Incident

The explosion seen from the Keele overpassAt approximately 03:50 ET on the morning of August 10, 2008, a large explosion occurred at Sunrise Propane Industrial Gases, located near Murray Road and Spalding Road. This was followed by a series of explosions which sent large fireballs and clouds of smoke billowing into the sky. Large pieces of metal from the exploding propane tanks were projected onto nearby streets and properties. Many homes and offices were damaged, windows were shattered, and doors were ripped from their hinges. About 200 firefighters battled the 5 alarm fire that resulted from the explosions.[2]

The threat of further blasts and concerns about the air quality forced the police to conduct a voluntary evacuation of a large area in the surrounding community. Residents living within a 1.6-kilometre radius were asked to leave their homes in the early hours of the morning.[9]Toronto Transit Commission buses were used to evacuate them to Downsview Park and then to York University.[1]

The explosions rocked the area and also caused the closure of part of Highway 401, between highways 404 and 400 for over 12 hours.[10] Emergency crews feared another major explosion as two rail tankers continued to burn more than five hours after the initial explosion.[11] Regular commercial air traffic was allowed to continue in and out of Pearson International Airport while smaller, privately owned aircraft were restricted from flying over the area.[2]

Six people were sent to the hospital, 18 people admitted themselves to emergency clinics, and Emergency Medical Services treated 40 people on the site.[12] During the course of the emergency response to the scene, a Toronto firefighter was found lifeless by emergency crews. Paramedics and firefighters tried to revive him but were unsuccessful. He was then rushed to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. The firefighter was identified as Bob Leek, a 55-year-old district chief of emergency planning and a 25-year veteran.[2] Parminder Saini, a Sunrise employee was unaccounted for, and on August 11, a body was found at the scene. On September 3, the body was confirmed to be that of Saini.[13][14]

Cause and investigation
The Ontario Fire Marshal's Office is handling the investigation of the explosions.[2] While the cause of the explosions has not yet been determined, on August 21, 2008, Ontario's independent safety regulator for fuels, the Technical Standards and Safety Authority, released a statement saying that just before the explosion, a truck driver was illegally transferring propane from one truck to another, which is prohibited in Ontario because it increases the risk of a gas leak or fire. The agency also reported that in November 2006, Sunrise Propane was warned about its lack of safety by not stopping the truck-to-truck transfers at the company's facilities, and that truck-to-truck transfers were a frequent and routine operating practice at the facility.[5]

An investigator with the Ontario Fire Marshal's Office stated that it could take months before the cause of the explosions can be determined. Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty also said that the province is willing to provide financial aid to residents whose homes were damaged by the explosions.[15]

As of October 2009, the cause has not yet been determined. The Ontario Fire Marshal's office is still investigating the explosions and has yet to issue a report.[3]

Aftermath

Highway 401 was closed due to its proximity of the explosion.Due to the proximity to the site Highway 401 was shut down from Highway 404 to Highway 400, and the local Yorkdale Mall was closed for part of the day.[4] Toronto Transit Commission routes and the York Region Transit Viva Orange route were affected as a result of evacuation zone. Bus routes were diverted and a section of the Yonge-University-Spadina subway line between Downsview Station and Lawrence West Station was shut down for part of the day. GO Transit services to Yorkdale Bus Terminal were also suspended.[16]

About 15 hours after the first explosions, some residents were given the go-ahead to return to their homes. However, many people returning to their homes were stopped at police checkpoints and turned back, or not permitted to take their vehicles into the immediate area.[10] Approximately 100 of the 12,000 homes evacuated were left uninhabitable,[17][18] On August 11, almost all residents who had to be evacuated were allowed back, though about 20 families had to wait, while tests by health officials were conducted over concerns about airborne asbestos.[18]

As a result of the explosion, Toronto officials plan on reviewing all industrial areas that could pose a potential threat to residential neighbourhoods to prevent similar situations. As part of its investigation TSSA officials and the Ontario Fire Marshal are reviewing past inspections of the facility to determine the cause of the explosions.[19]

The explosion caused damage to one of Toronto's oldest Jewish cemeteries, Mount Sinai Memorial Park. The cemetery is over 100 years old and has more than 11,000 graves, of which at least 20 were damaged.[20]

Various residents were angry because the municipal government allowed Sunrise to build a propane facility in a residential area. Some residents claim that the community was not consulted or notified about the facility when it was being built. However, Shelley Carroll, Toronto's acting deputy mayor, suggested that the facility had been zoned before many of the homes were built.[8]

The Technical Standards and Safety Authority, the agency that regulates fuel safety in Ontario, originally said that it had only inspected Sunrise once since it opened in 2005. They later contradicted this by stating that they had issued stop work orders in 2006 and 2007 over safety violations.[21]

On August 19, nine days after the explosions, Sunrise issued a short news release, stating that the company regrets the loss of life and that they were co-operating with authorities' investigations. The news release also said that they would not be making any more public comments in the near future to prevent speculation and misinformation.[22]

Six other propane facilities in the province have been shut down as a result of an audit prompted by the explosions. Facilities in Kitchener, Waterloo, Cornwall, Ottawa, and two in Toronto have been ordered to shut down after failing to show that their employees were properly trained at the facilities.[23]

Parminder Saini's father was granted a visa to travel from Punjab to Canada to aid in the investigation, though Parminder's brother and mother were denied by the Canadian Consulate. This decision was later changed after the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was informed of the situation.[24]

Felipe De Leon, an employee at Sunrise, stated that he had completed an illegal propane transfer when he noticed smoke at the north end of the facility. De Leon said he then went inside the facility's office to warn Parminder to flee the building, though he refused. De Leon then fled from the facility while Parminder walked towards the smoke.[5]

Cleaning up the result of the explosion cost the city of Toronto $CAD 1.8 million, half of which was paid by the province of Ontario.[3]

Charges laid
On August 5, 2009, the Ontario Ministry of Labour laid 2 charges in the incident. One of the charges relates to the failure of protecting Saini. The other charge alleges that the company failed to operate within mandatory industry standards. If convicted, the company could be fined up to $1 million.[25] Additionally, the residents filed a $300 million lawsuit.[26]

BLEVE !!!!

BLEVE

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

เรื่องการระเบิดของสารเคมีที่สามารถเกิดขึ้นในโรงงานปิโตรเคมีครับ โดยส่วนใหญ่แล้วสามารถแบ่งออกได้เป็น 2 ประเภทใหญ่ๆ ตามกลไกของการเกิดระเบิดออกเป็นดังนี้ ครับ
จาก http://www.4uengineer.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=30

1. Vapor Cloud Explosions: VCE

ระเบิดชนิดนี้เกิดบ่อยมากที่สุดในอุตสาหกรรมเคมีทั้งหลายโดยที่จะเป็นการระเบิดจากของสารไวไฟในสภาพก๊าซ โดยที่การระเบิดประเภทนี้มีลักษณะการเกิดตามขั้นตอนดังนี้

1. ก๊าซไวไฟทั้งหลายรั่วออกมาเป็นจำนวนมาก โดยส่วนใหญ่จะรั่วออกมาจากรอยรั่วของของถังเก็บก๊าซไวไฟ
2. มีการแพร่กระจายตัวของก๊าซไวไฟออกไปครอบคลุมอาณาบริเวณรอบๆ
3. เมื่อได้สัดส่วนอยู่ในช่วง flammability limit เพราะได้ผสมกับอากาศ
4. มีจุดที่ทำให้เกิดประกายไฟ คือ ignition Source หรือ Ignition Energy ซึ่งจะต้องมีค่ามากพอที่จะทำไห้เกิดการติดไฟด้วยความเร็วสูง ( เพื่อที่จะปลดปล่อยพลังงานออกมาได้เยอะๆ ในเวลาสั้นๆ)
5. เกิดระเบิด vapor cloud explosion ทันที เมื่อ Ignition Source หรือ Ignition Energy มีค่ามากพอ
6. การเกิดลูกไฟ ( Fire Ball ) แทน ที่จะเป็นระเบิดแบบ VCE ถ้า Ignition Source หรือ Ignition Energy มีค่าน้อยไม่เพียงพอที่จะก่อให้เกิดการระเบิดขึ้นได้

ระเบิดประเภทนี้ ถ้าเป็นก๊าซเชื้อเพลิงจะมีกลิ่นกระจายไปทั่วนะครับ แนะนำให้หนีไปไกลที่สุดจากแหล่งกำเนิด เท่าที่จะทำได้นะครับ โดยเราต้องคาดการณ์เอาเองนะครับว่าแหล่งกำเนิดอยู่จุดใดนะครับ ยกตัวอย่างเหตุการณ์นี้ ก็มี รถก๊าซ LPG ระเบิดที่ถนนเพชรบุรีเมื่อสิบกว่าปีก่อนนะครับ โดยที่เหตุการณ์เกิดขึ้นจากรถก๊าซเกิดอุบัติเหตุ ทำให้ถังในรถก๊าซแตก และ รั่ว แล้วเกิดปรากฏการณ์ดังตัวอย่างข้างบนครับ งานนี้มีผู้เสียชีวิตจำนวนมากเลย ชาวบ้านนอนอยู่ในตึกแถวดีๆก็ถูกไฟไหม้ครับ

2. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions: BLEVE

BLEVE เกิดเมื่อ vessel ที่เก็บสารไวไฟ (ในรูปของเหลว) ถูกไฟเผา ซึ่งจะทำให้ของเหลวภายใน vessel มีอุณหภูมิสูงขึ้น และทำให้เกิดการระเหยตัวของของเหลวมากขึ้นทุกทีต่อเนื่องไปเรื่อยๆตามช่วงเวลาของการถูกความร้อน ทำให้ความดันภายในถังสูงขึ้นมาก ถึงแม้ว่า vessel มีการติดตั้งวาวล์ระบายความดันแล้วแต่ก็ไม่เพียงพอหรอกครับ เนื่องจากขนาดของวาวล์ระบายความดันอาจจะได้จากการคำนวณหาขนาดในสภาวะปกติ ดันนั้นเมื่อ vessel อยู่ภายใต้สภาวะถูกไฟไหม้ ขนาดของวาวล์ระบายความดันจึงไม่เพียงพอหรอกครับ ดังนั้นเพื่อนๆอาจเคยได้ยินเกี่ยวกับการเลือกขนาด วาวล์ระบายความดัน : fire case condition
ตอนนี้ผมขอกลับมาที่เดิมดีกว่าครับ อย่างที่เราทราบมาแล้วว่ายิ่งอุณหภูมิสูงขึ้นเท่าไรโลหะ vessel จะสุญเสียความแข็งแรงมากขึ้นเท่านั้นครับ มาถึงตอนนี้ความดันภายในถังมากขึ้นจนเหนือกว่าความแข็งแรงของ vessel แล้วจะทำให้เกิดการแตกหักของ vessel แล้วจะเกิด BLEVE โดยที่แรงดันของก๊าซภายในจะทำให้ถังแตกออกเป็นเสี่ยงๆ โดยที่บางส่วนของถังจะถูกแรงดันอัดให้ลอยไปไกลได้ และเกิดการฟุ้งกระจายของไอหรือก๊าซที่อยู่ภายในถังเก็บนี้

กรณีนี้เจ้าหน้าที่ดับเพลิงและไทยมุงอันตรายมากนะครับ เพราะบางทีไม่รู้ BLEVE เคยมีตัวอย่างที่ เจ้าหน้าที่ดับเพลิงที่ต่างประเทศตายนับสิบขณะดับเพลิงอยู่ ก็เพราะไม่ทราบปรากฏการณ์นี้แหละครับ เราเองก็อย่าไปมุงนะครับ อาจจะตายได้นะ

ก่อนที่จะจบผมขอให้คำศัพธ์เกี่ยวกับไฟเพิ่มเติมนะครับ

Pool Fire
เกิดจากของเหลวที่มีจุดเดือดในบรรยากาศสูงกว่าอุณหภูมิในบรรยากาศขณะนั้นเกิดการรั่วไหลไปตามพื้น เมื่อได้รับความร้อนจนติดไฟ ก็จะเกิดไฟเป็นบริเวณกว้างตามบริเวณของเหลวที่หกเรี่ยราดครับ

Flash Fire
ภายหลังที่สารไวไฟเกิดการรั่วๆไหลออกสู่บรรยากาศ กลายเป็น vapor cloud กลุ่มหมอกก๊าซจะแพร่กระจายไปตามทิศทางลม ซึ่งถูกทําให้เจือจางลงโดยอากาศที่เข้ามารวมกับกลุ่มหมอกก๊าซนี้ ทั้งนี้การแพร่จะขึ้นอยู่กับคุณสมบัติ ทางกายภาพของก๊าซ ลักษณะและสภาพของการรั่วไหล และสภาพภูมิอากาศ

Flash fire เกิดจากการที่กลุ่มหมอกก๊าซเหล่านั้นเกิดการจุดระเบิดขึ้นอย่างฉับพลัน(instantaneous) ดังนั้นผู้ที่อยู่ในบริเวณดังกล่าวจึงไม่สามารถหลบหนีได้ทัน จึงอาจส่งผลให้มีอัตราการสูญเสียชีวิตสูง แต่เนื่องจาก flash fire เกิดขึ้นอย่างฉับพลัน และความเข้มของรังสีความร้อนไม่สูงมากนัก ทําให้ผู้ที่อยู่บริเวณรอบนอกของกลุ่มหมอกก๊าซที่ติดไฟนั้น ไม่ได้รับอันตรายถึงขั้นเสียชีวิต นอกจากนี้ เหตุการณ์ดังกล่าวไม่น่าจะก่อให้เกิดความเสียหายร้ายแรงต่อทรัพย์สิน นอกเสียจากว่าจะเกิดเพลิงไหม้อย่างต่อเนื่อง จากวัตถุที่ติดไฟในขณะที่เกิดการลุกไหม้แล้วเกิดการติดไฟอย่างรวดเร็ว แต่ปริมาณของสารและความเร็วของเปลวไฟไม่มากพอที่จะเกิดแรงดันหรือระเบิดได้ครับภายหลังจากที่ก๊าซเกิดการรั่วไหล

Fireball
เกิดจากการการรั่วไหลของสารติดไฟอย่างรวดเร็วมากในช่วงแรก จากนั้นจะลดลงอย่างรวดเร็ว เนื่องจาก vessel ฉีกขาดดังที่ผมได้กล่าวข้างบนแล้วครับ จึงทำให้สารพุ่งกระจายสู่บรรยากาศและหากมีการจุดระเบิด เนื่องจากการเกิดไฟฟ้าสถิตย์หรือการเกิดประกายไฟ จะทําให้เกิด fire ball ลักษณะลูกไฟขนาดใหญ่ครับ และอาจตามดัวย Jet fire โดยลักษณะไฟของ BLEVE จะมีลักษณะเป็นลูกไฟ

Jet Fire
เกิดจากสารเคมีที่เก็บไว้ภายใต้ความดันสูงเกิดการรั่วไหลจึงฟุ้งกระจายสู่บรรยากาศ แล้วเกิดการจุดระเบิดในทันที และเกิดการลุกไหม้ในลักษณะคล้ายคบเพลิง (blow torch) ทั้งนี้เปลวไฟที่เกิดขึ้น จะครอบคลุมระยะทางเท่าไรนั้น ขึ้นอยู่กับขนาดของรูรั่ว และความดันในเส้นท่อ หรือ vessel

ความร้อนที่แผ่กระจายออกมาจากเปลวไฟของ Jet fire จะขึ้นอยู่กับประเภทของก๊าซที่รั่วออกมา โดยทั่วไปอุณหภูมิของเปลวไฟจะอยู่ในช่วง 1,600 - 2,000 องศาเซลเซียส ทั้งนี้เนื่องจาก jet fire มีปริมาณความร้อนสูง (high heat flux) ดังนั้นจึงทําให้เกิดความเสียหายต่ออุปกรณ์ หรือโครงสร้างใดๆ ที่สัมผัสกับเปลวไฟโดยตรง

อันตรายของ fire ball ส่วนใหญ่จะเกิดจากปริมาณการแผ่รังสีความร้อนที่เพิ่มมากขึ้นอย่างมหาศาลในเวลาอันรวดเร็ว แต่เนื่องจาก fire ball จะเกิดขึ้นอย่างรวดเร็วในช่วง เวลาสั้นๆ ในขณะที่ Jet fire จะเกิดขึ้นอย่างต่อเนื่อง เป็นระยะเวลานาน ดังนั้น เมื่อเกิดรอยแตกขึ้นแล้ว ความเสียหายที่เกิดจาก Jet fire จะมีความรุนแรงมากกว่าความเสียหายที่เกิดจาก fire ball


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A BLEVE erupting from a tanker.

BLEVE (pronounced /ˈblɛvi/ BLEV-ee), is an acronym for boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion. This is a type of explosion that can occur when a vessel containing a pressurized liquid is ruptured. Such explosions can be extremely hazardous.

A BLEVE results from the rupture of a vessel containing a liquid substantially above its atmospheric boiling point. The substance is stored partly in liquid form, with a gaseous vapour above the liquid filling the remainder of the container.

If the vessel is ruptured — for example, due to corrosion, or failure under pressure — the vapour portion may rapidly leak, lowering the pressure inside the container. This sudden drop in pressure inside the container causes violent boiling of the liquid, which rapidly liberates large amounts of vapour. The pressure of this vapour can be extremely high, causing a significant wave of overpressure (an explosion) which may completely destroy the storage vessel and project fragments over the surrounding area.

BLEVEs can also be caused by an external fire near the storage vessel causing heating of the contents and pressure build-up. While tanks are often designed to withstand great pressure, constant heating can cause the metal to weaken and eventually fail. If the tank is being heated in an area where there is no liquid, it may rupture faster without the liquid to absorb the heat. Gas containers are usually equipped with relief valves that vent off excess pressure, but the tank can still fail if the pressure is not released quickly enough.

Bleve explosion.png

A BLEVE can occur even with a non-flammable substance such as water[1], liquid nitrogen, liquid helium or other refrigerants or cryogens, and therefore is not usually considered a type of chemical explosion. However, if the substance involved is flammable, it is likely that the resulting cloud of the substance will ignite after the BLEVE has occurred, forming a fireball and possibly a fuel-air explosion, also termed a vapor cloud explosion (VCE). If the materials are toxic, a large area will be contaminated.[2]

Significant industrial BLEVEs include accidents at Feyzin in France in 1966, Kingman, Arizona in 1973, Texas City, Texas in 1978, Murdock, Illinois in 1983 and San Juan Ixhuatepec in Mexico City in 1984[3]. In 1978, a BLEVE occurred after a road accident with an LPG truck in the Los Alfaques Disaster in Spain.

Some fire mitigation measures are listed under liquefied petroleum gas.

In the firefighting community, BLEVE is sometimes used as a humorous backronym for "big loud explosion very exciting" or "blast leveling everything very effectively."[citation needed]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ http://www.inspect-ny.com/plumbing/Water_Heater_Relief_Valves.htm
  2. ^ http://chemelab.ucsd.edu/processdesign/safety/safety-notes.pdf accessed 2009-01-06
  3. ^ www.hse.gov.uk

[edit] External links

Structure and Expression of Failure Knowledge Database

Structure and Expression of Failure Knowledge Database

(Explanation of Failure Mandalas)
March 2005
Dr. Yotarou Hatamura
Supervisor, Failure Knowledge Database Project
Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST)
from http://shippai.jst.go.jp/en/Search
*** ถ้ารู้ว่า มีความเสี่ยง ซึ่งอาจทำอันตรายให้กับสาธารณะ ควรเร่งกำจัดความเสี่ยงนั้น ***

1. The Need for a Structured Expression of Failure

2. Structure and Sequence of Failure

3. Expressing the Elements of Failure through Mandalas

4. Explanation of Failure Mandalas

(a) Cause Mandala

(b) Action Mandala

(c) Result Mandala

5. Expression by Scenario



1. The Need for a Structured Expression of Failure

When we look at the recent high incidence of a diverse variety of failure in Japan, we could be forgiven for thinking that we are witnessing failure on parade. What are the reasons for this frequency of failure? What can we do to prevent the repeated occurrence of failures? A variety of organizations and individuals are active in well thought-out initiatives to prevent the recurrence of failures. The most common activity is the production of compilations of case studies of events such as failures, problems, and accidents. Businesses serious in this field have been working hard to produce compilations of failure case studies. But these compilations are hardly ever made use of. From the point of view of the people who produce such compilations, whose aim is to see their work put to use to prevent unnecessary repetition of failure, it must be particularly frustrating to see their work ignored and the same failures repeated. One of the reasons why such compilations are not used is that failure knowledge is not being effectively communicated.

In fact, one of the purposes of the Japan Science and Technology Agency in creating the Failure Knowledge Database was precisely to provide a means of communicating failure knowledge. The main reason why the many diverse compilations of failure case studies are not being applied in practice is that knowledge of past failures is not being communicated to the very people interested in applying this knowledge to prevent failure. If we can properly communicate failure knowledge, and if the people receiving that knowledge can use it correctly, then the needless repetition of failure can be halted. Accordingly, we should ask the question "What is the best way to communicate failure knowledge?" The answer is to give people who encounter failure a clear idea of how to structure failure knowledge, and have them describe a case study of the failure in terms of that structure. This then makes that failure knowledge easier to find and access for anybody wishing to learn from that experience, and, as the procedure of structuring failure knowledge is repeated, that procedure becomes better known and more widely established. The most important concept here is the structuring of failure knowledge. When structuring failure knowledge, the most important aspects are breaking the failure down into its component parts and expressing that breakdown clearly. This is shown in Fig. 1 below.

Fig. 1 Analysis and Expression of the Occurrence of Failure

Most people, when they analyze a failure, see it in terms of "cause and result" (Fig. 1, Caption (a)): First the cause takes place, followed by its inevitable effect, or result, as we refer to it. This is a simple, easy-to-grasp analysis that most people have no problem taking in, but it has one significant drawback. It assumes that where a cause exists, a result will always follow, but does not allow for cases where a cause exists and no result follows. According to the currently prevalent way of thinking, if the cause is removed, the result will not follow. But is this really the case? Is it not really the case that, on many occasions when failure has been dealt with by applying this way of thinking, it has merely led to the repetition of failure?
Let us take a look at the chronological progression of a failure (Fig. 1, Caption (b)). In fact, all we can really see are the events that take place in front of our eyes. We cannot see the cause or the background. As a developing failure becomes evident as a failure, a person takes action to deal with the unfolding sequence of events. We can think of these events and the action taken in response to them as results. In addition, a variety of related developments take place. The best term to describe such developments is "sequels".
Let us now consider how to express the occurrence of failure in the easiest possible way for people wishing to make use of failure knowledge to take in (Fig. 1, Caption (c)). First we have the "incident" (in other words the failure that has occurred); next we have the "sequence" of the failure (how the failure develops with the passage of time); then we have the "cause" (what the presumed cause is and whether or not it is noticed at the time of failure); finally we have the "response" (the action taken in response to the failure). These four stages are combined to give the "overview". Expressing an occurrence of failure in terms of these five items makes the task of obtaining a comprehensive understanding of that failure much easier for people wishing to learn from it. Failure knowledge - what we can actually learn from the failure - must then be extracted from this information and formulated in such a way (as a "knowledge formulation") that it can be readily communicated to people wishing to make use of it. The six items identified in this paragraph comprise the minimum requirements of a coherent expression of failure.
We can also view failure as a unified system (Fig. 1, Caption (d)). In the fields of science and engineering, the occurrence of an event is viewed in its entirety as a single system, through which input leads to output. These three elements (input, system, and output) could otherwise be termed trigger, characteristics, and result. In an actual engineering system, all three elements can be seen, but in a "failure system" only the result is visible - the trigger and characteristics that lead to it are not. In order to view failure as a system, it is necessary to "look back" from the result and guess or estimate the trigger and characteristics, then to verify the accuracy of these guesses or estimates to positively identify the trigger and characteristics. Once the characteristics have been identified, it is possible to view the failure in terms of characteristics, with a trigger leading to a result. The joining of trigger and characteristics as described here is equivalent to the "cause" in the "cause and result" mentioned above, by which most people commonly define failure.
When failure actually occurs, and the trigger and characteristics are determined by "working back" from the result, it becomes clear that one more important element is missing. The occurrence of failure is tempered by certain restrictions (Fig. 1, Caption (e)). In any system with given characteristics, a trigger works on those characteristics, but those characteristics are in fact also subject to certain restrictions, and these restrictions can also play a part in the occurrence of failure. In this way of thinking, the trigger and characteristics represent the "cause" in the "cause and result" mentioned above, and the restrictions are often equated with the "background".

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2. Structure and Sequence of Failure

It is often said that all failure is the result of human error and, of course, "we all make mistakes". When a person experiences failure, it often seems that only the "result" is apparent, particularly to those not directly concerned with or affected by the failure. However, once we investigate and analyze that failure, we understand that a failure consists of a cause, in response to which a person takes action, leading to the resulting failure. In this reasoning, action can be regarded as the human intervention that links the cause and result of the failure, neither cause alone nor action alone will lead to failure, and failure can only result when both cause and action exist. If we create a sequence of events based on this way of thinking, we first have a human cause, followed by human action, leading to a result (Fig. 2, Caption (a)). In the Failure Knowledge Database, we refer to the cause --> action --> result sequence that leads to failure as a "scenario". As an example, look at the following two chains of events:

  • Through my own carelessness, I forgot to turn off the switch and a fire started.
  • Because I was looking to one side, I didn't turn in time and I ran into a wall.

The similarity of the two scenarios is quite clear: The first phrase of each case ("Through my own carelessness" and "Because I was looking to one side") represents a cause that we can identify as carelessness; the second phrase ("I forgot to turn off the switch" and "I didn't turn in time") represents an action (in fact an action that should have been taken but was not); the third phrase ("a fire started" and "I ran into a wall") represents a resulting failure. We can represent this graphically as a "failure tree" (Fig. 2, Caption (b)). The tree consists of the trunk (cause), the boughs (actions), and the branches (results) all of which are bound together in the whole. Taking the analogy further, we can say that the case studies hang from the branches like the fruit of a tree. A branch from which many case studies hang represents a scenario in the real world that often results in failure. Using this tree expression, it becomes easier to determine what kind of scenario only rarely results in failure and what kind of scenario results in deadly failure. Taking the analogy still further, we can say that a group of failure trees in proximity represents a "failure forest" (Fig. 2, Caption (c)). We identified ten "human" causes of failure: "Carelessness", as described above, "Unknown Cause", "Ignorance", "Misjudgment", "Ignorance of Procedure", "Insufficient Analysis or Research", "Poor Response to Change in Environment", "Poor Concept", "Poor Value Perception", and "Organizational Problems". If we create one tree per cause, these ten trees together form the failure forest, through which we can express any failure.

Fig. 2 Structure and Sequence of Failure

Next, we look at a three-dimensional expression of the occurrence of failure (Fig. 3). As mentioned above when describing the failure tree, failure consists of "human" causes that form the basis of subsequent human actions. The result of those actions leads to the occurrence of failure. These three components of failure are shown in Fig. 3, Caption (a). Cause is represented as the bottom layer, action as the middle layer, and result as the top layer. By using solid lines to represent the connections between these components, we can produce a three-dimensional expression of the scenario of a failure. Fig. 3, Caption (b) shows the sequence reversed, with the cause positioned at the top and the result at the bottom. If we apply this sequence to the first of the examples mentioned above ("Through my own carelessness, I forgot to turn off the switch and a fire started"), we can draw a line from the cause "Carelessness" to the action "Non-Regular Movement", and on to the result "Bad Event". If we apply the same sequence to the second of the examples mentioned above ("Because I was looking to one side, I didn't turn in time and I ran into a wall"), we again see "Carelessness" as the cause, followed by the lack of action, Non-Regular Movement, leading to the Bad Event that is the collision. By applying this three-dimensional expression to a variety of case studies, we can determine not only what kind of scenario develops in what kind of situation, but also, because a scenario with many case studies is represented with a concentration of connecting lines, the frequency with which a given scenario leads to failure. Such information can then be used to predict and prevent failure.

Fig. 3 Three-Dimensional Expression of the Occurrence of Failure


3. Expressing the Elements of Failure through Mandalas

In this section, we explore the hierarchical relationship between the elements that make up the components of failure, taking as an example one of the elements of "cause". (In Fig. 4. and subsequent diagrams this element is "Carelessness".) If we assume Carelessness to be a "parent" concept, we can identify a variety of "child" concepts (such as "by accident" or "through distraction") which can themselves have child concepts. If we represent this idea in pyramid form, we have a structure such as in Fig. 4, Caption (a). If we represent the same information as a cladogram, we have a structure such as in Fig. 4, Caption (b). If we then collect all of the "parents" (along with their "children") that are identified as causes of failure and combine them in a single diagram, with lines drawn to show links as in a node diagram, we have a structure such as in Fig. 4, Caption (c). This type of diagram maps all of the elements of cause of failure and illustrates their hierarchical relationship.
Specializing one step further, if we represent each ring of nodes as a concentric circle, we have a structure such as in Fig. 4, Caption (d), which we refer to as a "mandala". (Mandalas are Buddhist representations of the universe and Buddhist teaching that we took as inspiration for our innovative method of expressing failure knowledge.) At the heart of the mandala is the central concept. The inner ring contains what we refer to as the top level elements. Whether for cause, action, or result, it eases understanding to divide this level into 10 key phrases. The outer ring contains what we refer to as the second level elements, of which there are 20 to 30 for each mandala. In the classification system used for the Failure Knowledge Database, we have arranged a third level of elements outside the second level ring. The third level elements are designed to be more specifically tailored to particular fields and case studies. The top and second levels are designed so that they can be applied to case studies in any field, but the third level classifications are designed to be field-specific.
We have created three mandalas: one each for Cause, Action, and Result. Hereafter the three mandalas are referred to as "Failure Mandalas".

Fig. 4 Type and hierarchy for the Elements of Failure

Next, we look at creating a three-dimensional version of one of the mandalas (in this case, cause; see Fig. 5). With many failures, analysis reveals the elements of cause to be factors such as carelessness or lack of preparation. By analyzing these factors, we can extract and define classifications of types of cause, such as the top level concepts "Ignorance" and "Misjudgment".
However, if we view the elements of cause from a different standpoint, we can see that there are other means of classification. For example, "Carelessness" can be classed as a cause for which the individual is responsible, "Poor Concept" can be classed as a cause for which the organization is responsible, and "Change in Environment" can be classed as a cause for which society is responsible. In other words, there is another thought process that involves relating causes to the expansion of the selected range from the individual, through the organization, to society. By following this train of thought, we see that, in the process of investigating the elements of cause, even as there is a toing and froing of thoughts between the abstract and the concrete, or between the individual and society, viewed overall, there is a "rise" toward abstract, top level concepts starting from individual, concrete elements and passing through organizational and societal elements. This way of thinking is illustrated in Fig. 6, Caption (a), which shows a mandala opened out into a spiral staircase that spirals clockwise, inward, and up, gradually rising to the center. In Fig. 6, Caption (b), the spiral staircase is removed, showing the thought path only as a whole. This path spirals inward and upward to the top and center, and it is the idea that we find here that we can regard as the genuine top level concept, and thus communicate to others as failure knowledge. The communication of failure knowledge is illustrated in Fig. 7. As illustrated on the left side of Fig. 7, a person who wants to communicate information on a failure must process that information from concrete details to abstract "top level concept (failure scenario) of cause, action, and result" along the rising thought spiral in order to formulate workable failure knowledge. Only then, as failure knowledge, can the information be successfully passed on to others. In similar fashion, the right side of Fig. 7 illustrates how a person who wants to receive information on a failure first receives that information in abstract form as a failure scenario. The recipient then processes that scenario via a descending thought spiral in order to extract concrete, practically applicable failure knowledge.

Fig. 5 Hierarchy of Elements and Correlation to Mandala (for Cause)
Fig. 6 Train of Thought
Fig. 7 Communicating Failure Knowledge According to Train of Thought

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4. Explanation of Failure Mandalas

When we first created the Failure Mandalas, we thought that the idea of rotating in order and heading toward the center would only be applicable for a Cause Mandala in the field of Mechanical Engineering. But gradually, as discussions on the creation of the Failure Knowledge Database progressed, we came to realize that all of the Cause, Action, and Result Mandalas could be applied to any field. From then on, we approached the creation of the Failure Knowledge Database with a mentality which could be summed up as "Not perfect, but close".



(a) Cause Mandala (Fig. 8)

There are 10 top level key phrases and 27 second level key phrases. These key phrases can be applied to any of the four fields (Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, Chemicals and Plants, and Civil Engineering) that are used in the creation of the database. At the top level, we divide the classifications into four broad groups depending on "who" or "what" is to blame: Nobody is Responsible, Individual is Responsible, Organization is Responsible, and Neither Individual nor Organization is Responsible.

  • Nobody is Responsible is represented in the Mandala as Unknown Cause.
  • Individual is Responsible is split into five subclassifications: Ignorance, Carelessness, Ignorance of Procedure, Misjudgment, and Insufficient Analysis or Research.
  • Neither Individual nor Organization is Responsible is represented in the Mandala as Poor Response to Change in Environment.
  • Organization is Responsible is split into three subclassifications: Poor Concept, Poor Value Perception, and Organizational Problems.

Note that we consider the second level key phrases Change in Environment and Change in Economic Factors of the top level key phrase Poor Response to Change in Environment to be essentially the result of external factors that cannot satisfactorily be classed as the responsibility of either an individual or an organization.

Cause Mandala
Fig. 8 Cause Mandala

The top level key phrases and the second level key phrases under them are listed and described below.

Individual is Responsible

  • Ignorance : Insufficient Knowledge - Disregard of Tradition
    Individuals not knowing the standard way to prevent or solve failure, even if such knowledge is well known.
    • Insufficient Knowledge
      An individual or the people around him/her not knowing about established, known technical information.
    • Disregard of Tradition
      An individual not knowing about an industry or enterprise's conventions.
  • Carelessness : Insufficient Understanding - Insufficient Precaution - Fatigue or Poor Health
    Failure that could have been prevented by paying attention. Situations of being extremely busy or in poor physical condition causing a person to not pay sufficient attention.
    • Insufficient Understanding
      Failure caused by an individual having only superficial understanding of the fundamental issues of a procedure.
    • Insufficient Precaution
      Failure caused by an individual not paying sufficient attention because he/she is busy or cannot be bothered. Failure caused by an individual not taking adequate, known precautions.
    • Fatigue or Poor Health
      Fatigue or poor physical condition causing an individual to not pay sufficient attention.
  • Ignorance of Procedure : Insufficient Communication - Disregard of Procedure
    Failure caused by an existing procedure or rule not being followed.
    • Insufficient Communication
      Failure caused by information being inadequate or not being communicated adequately to those that need it.
    • Disregard of Procedure
      Failure caused by established procedures or methods, whether formal or informal, being ignored.
  • Misjudgment : Narrow Outlook - Misunderstanding - Misperception - Misjudgment of Situation
    A situation is not understood correctly, leading to an error of judgment. Evaluation criteria are incorrectly applied, the procedure by which decisions are made is not correctly followed, or elements normally expected to be considered in the decision-making process are missing.
    • Narrow Outlook
      Failure caused by an individual only considering a single aspect of a situation or ignoring possible and pertinent relationships between things and/or events.
    • Misunderstanding
      Failure caused by an individual understanding neither the situation nor its background principles and structures. For example, in the case of a leaking container of combustible gas, an individual may think that the way to turn off the valve is to turn it in a clockwise direction, as is normal. However, some valves turn off in the opposite direction, and turning such a valve clockwise would increase the leak.
    • Misperception
      Failure caused by individuals believing they are acting in the correct manner, but in fact are not because of a misapplication of their knowledge. For example, in the case of a leaking container of combustible gas, an individual may know that the correct way to turn off the valve is to turn it in an anti-clockwise direction (that is, not the "normal" direction), but through a lapse in thought turn the valve in the opposite direction, thus increasing the leak.
    • Misjudgment of Situation
      Failure caused by an individual not understanding what is happening. For example, an individual may discover a fire and, believing it to be fueled by wood, spray water on it. But if the fire is in fact caused by burning cooking oil, spraying water will cause the fire to spread.
  • Insufficient Analysis or Research : Insufficient Practice - Insufficient Prior Research - Insufficient Environment Study
    Failure caused by lack of preparation in the decision-making process. Higher up the decision-making ladder, failure caused by not considering appropriate action to take if problems occur.
    • Insufficient Practice
      Failure caused by lack of practice or because practice conditions do not match actual conditions. Hazardous Operability Training (HAZOP) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are examples of virtual testing systems that are certified by industry.
    • Insufficient Prior Research
      Failure caused by insufficient research into component parts and chemicals of products, including controls over production methods regarding adherence to safety rules, functions, and characteristics. For example, there are many cases of the reactivity of chemicals not being adequately researched, leading to failure.
    • Insufficient Environment Study
      Research into the environment in which a substance or product is to be used or the economic environment is either inadequate or conditions change after the research is complete.

Neither Individual nor Organization is Responsible

  • Poor Response to Change in Environment : Change in Environment - Change in Economic Factors
    Failure due to a change in circumstances with insufficient time to adapt accordingly.
    • Change in Environment
      The environment at the time of initiation of a project changes by the time of completion of the project, but there is insufficient time to adapt the project appropriately.
    • Change in Economic Factors
      The economic environment at the time of initiation of a project changes by the time of completion of the project, but there is insufficient time to adapt the project appropriately (for example, due to sudden fluctuations in interest rates or exchange rates).

Organization is Responsible

  • Poor Concept : Poor Authority Structure - Poor Organization - Poor Strategy or Concept
    Failure caused by problems at the planning stage or in the plan itself. Individuals working on plans conceived by predecessors or superiors may sometimes take responsibility for the failure of those plans.
    • Poor Authority Structure
      Failure caused by not obtaining the necessary permission or rights (such as patents) to complete a project.
    • Poor Organization
      Failure caused by flawed or inflexible organization structure.
    • Poor Strategy or Concept
      Failure caused by poor strategy or concept.
  • Poor Value Perception : Difference in Culture (for example, failure to adjust to different customs) - Poor Organizational Culture - Poor Safety Awareness
    Failure caused by individuals holding a different outlook or values from the people around them. Failure when a company gives more priority to profit than to observing rules.
    • Difference in Culture
      Failure caused by differences in culture and failure to adjust to or understand the surrounding culture. Technology from one culture may be misunderstood in another culture or have different standards or measurement units.
    • Poor Organizational Culture
      The rules of the corporation override the rules of society so that societal responsibility is neglected. Covering up a relatively minor failure to avoid negative consequences, leading to more substantial failure. Recent examples include the failures that occurred at Snow Brand Milk LTD, Nippon Meat Packers, Inc, and Mitsubishi Motors.
    • Poor Safety Awareness
      Lax safety standards and awareness due to inadequate control by the body responsible for safety because of, for example, the safety supervisor's assumption that somebody else will take responsibility for safety or cost-cutting measures at the expense of safety. A notorious example of this is the battery factory disaster in Bhopal, India.
  • Organizational Problems : Inflexible Management Structure - Poor Management - Poor Staff
    Failure caused by organizational shortcomings preventing the smooth flow of operations. Executives and managers realize their responsibility for guaranteeing the flow of operations, but neglect that responsibility, which may make problems worse.
    • Inflexible Management Structure
      In organizations with vertically structured management systems or unclear assignment of authority and responsibility to personnel, relatively minor decisions may need to be taken by high-level management and confrontation of problems is easily put off. In such cases, if a problem occurs, the organization and its staff cannot respond quickly enough or lack the authority to respond.
    • Poor Management
      Failure caused by problems of management such as top-level management decisions not being communicated throughout the organization, management not being fully aware of the true situation at lower levels, and superiors not adequately supervising subordinates.
    • Poor Staff
      Failure caused at "shop-floor" level, for example by subordinates failing to raise a problem with superiors, by individual selfishness affecting decision-making, or by lack of willingness to learn. Apart from failure explicitly caused by laziness or sabotage, blame for this kind of failure usually rests equally with the management and the managed.

Nobody is Responsible

  • Unknown Cause : Occurrence of Unknown Phenomenon - Occurrence of Abnormal Phenomenon
    Failure caused by a previously unknown phenomenon. The thread of human history can be said to be a catalogue of advances in science and technology brought about as countermeasures to failures caused by phenomena encountered for the first time. Such failures can be learned from and can be said to be blessings in disguise.
    • Occurrence of Unknown Phenomenon
      Failure caused by conditions or events that cannot be foreseen using current knowledge or experience, as they have never happened before.
    • Occurrence of Abnormal Phenomenon
      Failure caused by phenomena that can be understood using current knowledge, experience, theories, or thinking, but have never been reported or experienced in this context, for example.

Note that the third level items are not included in the Cause Mandala. This is because this level is meant for field-specific items, to be created as relevant and required and positioned under the appropriate second level item.



(b) Action Mandala (Fig. 9)

There are 10 top level key phrases and 24 second level key phrases. These key phrases can be applied to any of the four fields (Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, Chemicals and Plants, and Civil Engineering) that are used in the creation of the database. At the top level, we can divide the classifications into two broad groups: failure through the actions of individuals on objects (Action on Objects) and failure through the actions themselves (Human Action).

  • Action on Objects is subdivided into Planning and Design, Production, and Usage.
  • Human Action is subdivided into Regular Operation, Non-Regular Operation, Regular Movement, Non-Regular Movement, Incorrect Reaction, Malicious Act, and Non-Regular Action.
When we consider the actions of individuals, we can broadly classify them into two groups: Regular and Non-Regular. Regular action refers to action taken by an individual that leads to failure regardless of whether or not there are any changes in external factors related to the situation. Non-regular action refers to action taken by an individual that leads to failure when changes in external factors occur and the individual's response to those changes is lacking in some way. Whereas, in the case of regular action, it is possible to implement preventive measures such as training and precautionary procedures, such measures are difficult to identify in the case of regular action, leaving the individual to bear the brunt of the blame. Note that, from their experience, many specialists attribute almost all failure to changes in objects and circumstances, but in our classification such failures correspond to failures caused by non-regular actions of individuals. (These failures are sometimes referred to as failures at the point of change.)
Note that some key phrases, such as Poor Planning and Nonobservance of Procedure, can be thought of as both cause and action, and so are included in both the Cause Mandala and the Action Mandala.

Action Mandala
Fig. 9 Action Mandala

The top level key phrases and the second level key phrases under them are listed and described below. These cover all aspects in the lifespan of "objects" from planning, through production and use, to disposal.

Action on Objects

  • Planning and Design : Poor Planning - Design Misuse
    This also includes such aspects as copycat design and licensed production.
    • Poor Planning
      Failure caused by a plan that is inadequate or impossible to execute. This includes plans for construction, construction management plans, operational plans, and scheduling.
    • Design Misuse
      Failure caused by using a design for other than its original purpose without modifying or understanding the design or its purpose. (This includes copycat designs and licensed production.) For example, operation methods, instrumentation systems, software systems, and office management.
  • Production : Hardware Production - Software Production
    This includes the manufacture of tools, machinery, and materials, as well as architecture and construction works.
    • Hardware Production
      Failure caused by badly produced machinery, tools, and other equipment. However, if the fault lies with the software controlling the hardware, that is considered a software failure.
    • Software Production
      Failure caused by badly produced software not performing well. This includes software design, as well as the selection and purchase of electrical goods and instruments that use the software.
  • Usage : Operation/Use - Maintenance/Repair - Transport/Storage - Disposal
    • Operation/Use
      Using machinery beyond the limits of its design or not according to the instructions. For example, reckless driving.
    • Maintenance/Repair
      Failure caused by inadequate maintenance or repair. For example, using the wrong lubricant in machines with moving parts or repairing by the wrong method.
    • Transport/Storage
      Failure caused by inadequate transportation or storage methods. For example, transporting at room temperature chemicals that require refrigeration or transporting sensitive measuring equipment in a truck with inadequate suspension.
    • Disposal
      Failure rooted in the preparation for, location of, or method of disposal. Note that violations of ethics/morality by persons involved in the disposal procedure are classified under Malicious Act below.

Human Action

Human actions are divided into three categories: Operation, Behavior, and Action.
Operation covers actions taken to initiate the actual use of tools, machinery, and other equipment. For example, the opening and shutting of valves and the driving of motor vehicles.
Behavior covers the physical behavior of individuals operating or preparing to operate tools, machinery, and other equipment. This includes accidents caused by colliding with objects, dropping things, stumbling, and falling down.
Action covers the intentional or willful actions by individuals and interaction between individuals, but excludes actions on physical objects (which are covered by Operation and Behavior).
The second level Human Action categories are listed and described below.

  • Regular Operation : Nonobservance of Procedure - Erroneous Operation
    Times at which people operate tools, machinery, and other equipment as normal, including times when not operating tools, etc.
    • Nonobservance of Procedure
      Failures caused by individuals not following proper procedure when operating tools, etc.
    • Erroneous Operation
      Using the wrong settings during operation or misusing tools, etc. For example, entering incorrect values in a control panel or indicating left when turning right in a car.
  • Non-Regular Operation : Change in Operation - Emergency Operation
    People operating tools, machinery, and other equipment in a way other than is normal. This includes starting and stopping in an emergency.
    • Change in Operation
      Operational procedures are occasionally changed. Individuals may use an old procedure by mistake, leading to failure.
    • Emergency Operation
      Failure caused by using the wrong procedures or methods due to the need to take urgent action, including failure to take evasive action. For example, not noticing traffic jam ahead and failing to brake in time.
  • Regular Movement : Careless Movement - Dangerous Movement - Wrong Movement
    Actions or movement by the operator when operating tools, machinery, and other equipment normally, including collisions, falling, dropping, and inaction.
    • Careless Movement
      Movement without taking into account the immediate situation. For example, standing up while working in a confined space and hitting one's head.
    • Dangerous Movement
      Movement without heed to safety. For example, riding a bicycle on a crowded pavement.
    • Wrong Movement
      Failure due to movement guided by misunderstanding, misconception, or lack of appropriate knowledge. For example, making a left turn when one should have turned right to reach a destination.
  • Non-Regular Movement : Movement During Transition - Movement During Poor Health
    People operating tools, machinery, and other equipment in a way other than is normal.
    • Movement During Transition
      Failure caused by individuals not knowing about changes in circumstances. Individuals panicking because of an unforeseen event and causing a failure.
    • Movement During Poor Health
      Failure caused by a decrease in an individual's judgment or ability because of bad physical condition.
  • Incorrect Reaction : Poor Communication - Self Protection
    This includes when information is misrepresented, concealed, or ignored.
    • Poor Communication
      Failure because required information (including instructions and reports) was not communicated. This does not include cases where individuals withhold information for reasons of self-protection.
    • Self Protection
      Failure caused by individuals acting to protect themselves and/or their relatives. This includes putting off decisions, misrepresenting, concealing, and ignoring information, presenting false information, and buck-passing.
  • Malicious Act : Ethics Violation - Rule Violation
    Failure due to an incorrect or wrong act. An act contrary to the law or to current society's expectations of correct behavior.
    • Ethics Violation
      Failure caused by violations of standards, including non-codified standards. For example, violations of ethics, morality, religion, common law, and agreements.
    • Rule Violation
      Violations of public law, a corporation's ordinances or bylaws, or of design standards such as Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) or American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). This includes breaking a contract.
  • Non-Regular Action : Change - Emergency Action - Inaction
    This is a broad classification for failure caused outside of normal situation and conditions. This includes organizational changes, changes to plans, and failure to act due to panic brought about by such changes.
    • Change
      Failure caused or partly caused by change.
    • Emergency Action
      Failure caused by reacting to an emergency in a way that is not normal behavior. This includes panicked reactions.
    • Inaction
      Failure caused by necessary action not being taken.

Note that the third level items are not displayed in the Action Mandala. This is because this level is meant for field-specific items, to be created as relevant and required and positioned under the appropriate second level item.
In the Action Mandala, the key phrases are broadly divided into two groups: "Action on Object" and "Human Action". Only "Human Action" is further divided into "Regular" and "Non-Regular". Although the distinction between "Regular" and "Non-Regular" is not explicit for "Action on Object", such a distinction can nonetheless be made. However, as mentioned previously, "Action on Object" by definition involves a sequence leading from initial planning of some sort, followed by creation or production, use, and finally disposal of the object. For ease of understanding, this is more suitably expressed as a sequential pattern than in terms of "Regular" and "Non-Regular" events, and the Action Mandala is designed accordingly.



(c) Result Mandala (Fig. 10)

There are 10 top level key phrases and 29 second level key phrases. These key phrases can be applied to any of the four fields (Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, Chemicals and Plants, and Civil Engineering) that are used in the creation of the database. At the top level, we divide the classifications into six broad groups depending on "who" or "what" is affected by the failure: Results on Objects, Results with External Consequences, Results with Human Consequences, Results with Consequences for Organization/Society, Results that will Occur, and Results that may Occur.

  • Results on Objects is split into three subclassifications: Malfunction, Bad Event, and Failure.
  • Results with External Consequences is represented in the Mandala as Secondary Damage.
  • Results with Human Consequences is split into two subclassifications: Bodily Harm and Psychological Harm.
  • Results with Consequences for Organization/Society is also split into two subclassifications: Loss to Organization and Damage to Society.
  • Results that will Occur is represented in the Mandala as Future Damage.
  • Results that may Occur is represented in the Mandala as Possible Damage.
Result Mandala
Fig. 10 Result Mandala

The top level key phrases and the second level key phrases under them are listed and described below.

Results on Objects

  • Malfunction : Specifications Not Met - Poor Hardware - Poor Software - Poor System
    Failure caused by products not performing as they should.
    • Specifications Not Met
      Failure caused by a product not performing according to its specifications.
    • Poor Hardware
      Failure caused by hardware not performing as it should.
    • Poor Software
      Failure caused by software not performing as it should.
    • Poor System
      Failure caused by a system not performing as it should.
  • Bad Event : Mechanical Event - Thermo-Fluid Event - Chemical Phenomenon - Electrical Failure
    Occasionally, what could be thought to be a negligible phenomenon triggers matters of great importance. For example, such occurrences as vibration, wear, heat generation, combustion, and leakage. The reason that Thermo-Fluid Event is a category here is that recently there have been many problems that cannot be categorized as heat only or fluids only.
    • Mechanical Event
      Mechanical defects caused by such occurrences as vibration or wear, but excluding actual damage.
    • Thermo-Fluid Event
      Failure caused by problems concerning fluids, heat, or both (generally the two are inseparable), such as heat transfer, temperature gradient, turbulent flow of gas or liquid, or flow at too high or low a speed.
    • Chemical Phenomenon
      Failure caused by chemical phenomena, such as combustion, chemical reactions, runaway reactions, and ignition.
    • Electrical Failure
      Failure caused by electrical events, such as short circuits, static electricity, and power failure.
  • Failure : Degradation - Abrasion - Deformation - Fracture/Damage - Large-Scale Damage
    Failure that involves objects of any scale breaking because of such phenomena as heat damage, corrosion, creep, sinking, and crashing.
    • Degradation
      The structural integrity of an object deteriorates because of, for example, heat, stress, or a chemical reaction.
    • Abrasion
      The abrasion of material such as iron plates because of phenomena such as wear, erosion, corrosion, or oxidation leading to a loss of strength or rupture.
    • Deformation
      A partial or complete change in the shape of such objects as piping or tools, leading to a reduction in functionality.
    • Fracture/Damage
      Partial or complete breakage of such objects as piping or tools due to fatigue, cracking, stress, or corrosion.
    • Large-Scale Damage
      Large-scale damage or complete destruction of an object. For example, an airplane crash, a ship sinking, or an explosion at a chemical or power plant.

Results with External Consequences

  • Secondary Damage : External Damage - Damage to Environment
    Relatively large-scale failure that causes subsequent damage or destruction to other objects. For example, pollution caused by fires or explosions, or leaking or emitting toxins into the environment.
    • External Damage
      Events such as fires and explosions that caused by failure of one sort and in turn cause damage to other things.
    • Damage to Environment
      Failure that causes environmental destruction (such as air or water pollution) either directly or indirectly.

Results with Human Consequences

  • Bodily Harm : Harm to Physical Well-being - Sickness - Injury - Death
    Any ill effects on the human body.
    • Harm to Physical Well-being
      Failure that causes damage to the human body. This category is used when it is not known if the result is sickness, injury, or death.
    • Sickness
      Failure that causes illness. The sickness can be acute or chronic. This includes such phenomena as miscarriages.
    • Injury
      Failure that causes injury.
    • Death
      Failure that causes death.
  • Psychological Harm : Mental Trauma
    This is a third level category including causes of fear, memory loss, loss of confidence, and grief.
    • Mental Trauma
      Failure that causes mental anguish such as fear, memory loss, loss of confidence, or grief.

Results with Consequences for Organization/Society

  • Loss to Organization : Economic Loss - Social Loss
    Failure that causes a loss to an organization, directly or indirectly. For example, compensation for damages, loss of confidence, or bankruptcy.
    • Economic Loss
      Tangible losses to an organization such as direct losses caused by accidents, rehabilitation costs, loss of income, and compensation for damages.
    • Social Loss
      Negative effects on an organization's standing in society, such as loss of sales, loss of confidence, or law suits.
  • Damage to Society : Social Systems Failure - Change in Perception
    Far-reaching negative effects on citizens and consumers, including failure of infrastructure, loss of faith in administrative organs and businesses, and changes in spending habits.
    • Social Systems Failure
      Disruption to social functions, such as by congestion of lifelines and damaging rumors.
    • Change in Perception
      General changes in the public's perceptions such as an increase in distrust of administrative organs and businesses and a rise in defensive instincts.

Results that will Occur

  • Future Damage : Results to Happen - Foreseeable Results - Unforeseeable Results
    The publicizing of a potential problem, such as global warming, which may not be apparent as a critical problem at present but will certainly be in the future. This type of failure is often made known as a result of in-house whistle-blowing.
    • Results to Happen
      A failure that is not such a large problem at present but will be a large problem in the future. For example, global warming or the collapse of a public pension scheme.
    • Foreseeable Results
      An event that, although it is not a big problem in the present, is predicted to have large consequences unless action is taken to counter it. For example, worldwide water shortages and climate change caused by the Earth tilting on its axis.
    • Unforeseeable Results
      A failure that we know nothing of at present and have no way of predicting, but will be a large problem in the future.

Results that may Occur

  • Possible Damage : Near Miss - Potential Hazard
    Negative effects that may or may not happen. Events with a low probability of occurring are not differentiated from those with a high probability of occurring.
    • Near Miss
      An event where a person is close to experiencing a danger, but no accident or failure actually occurs. A situation where a person realizes that a certain (quite feasible) combination of events could have led to failure.
    • Potential Hazard
      A situation of potential danger, where a certain (quite feasible) combination of events could cause an accident or failure (of which the person concerned may or may not be aware). Includes plans, decisions and actions taken without prior knowledge of future potential risk.

The component elements of cause, action, and result described above are grouped according to the structure indicated in Fig. 3, Caption (b) to create the Failure Mandalas indicated below in Fig. 11. Viewed on-screen in the Failure Knowledge Database, the "flow" down from Cause through Action to Result that makes up the scenario can be easily understood.
Note that, while the Committee for the Promotion of the Failure Knowledge Database believes that the Failure Mandalas are now the best available, it does not regard them as a perfect, finished product. As more and more data is accumulated, analyzed, and added to the database, and as more and more users' opinions are employed to refine the database content and structure, the Committee will update the Failure Mandalas accordingly to keep them as close to perfection as is possible.

Fig. 11 Visual Expression of Failure Scenario


5. Expression by Scenario

In order to better express and explain the structure of a failure case study, we have created what we call a "diagonal line drawing" based on Fig. 11. See Fig. 12 below.

Fig. 12 Diagonal Line Drawing of a Scenario

In this diagram, "Time" is represented on the horizontal axis and "Step" is represented on the vertical axis. Items are numbered in descending order from top left to bottom right. By means of the diagonal line drawing, the context that leads to the occurrence of failure (what we call the "scenario") can be clearly expressed. We call this a "diagonal scenario". It begins at top left with the cause. This consists of top level and second level key phrases (common to all failures) written out in order. These are supplemented, as required, by field-specific third level key phrase (and, if required, fourth, fifth and "deeper" levels). A double underline is inserted to separate the cause and action, and then the action is written out in the same way as the cause.

Note that, although it is possible to insert appropriately named key phrases at the third level and deeper, there is no need to add an underline before each key phrase. In a case where a single cause is followed by two actions, those two actions (or, more specifically, the key phrases that represent them) are separated by a single underline. So, in Fig. 12, the action is represented by two key phrases at points 4 and 7. Note that the numbering continues in a single unbroken sequence - it does not start afresh or branch off at key events in the scenario. As with cause and action, a double underline is inserted to separate the action and result, and then the result is written out in the same way as the cause and action. As progression from up to down represents the different steps involved in the failure, progression from left to right represents the passage of time. We feel that this diagonal line drawing not only best represents the unfolding scenario of a failure, from cause through action to result, but also renders the details involved extremely easy to grasp, analyze and remember.
A pictograph depicting the case study and a Knowledge Comment summarizing the case study can be inserted in the space on the top right or bottom left of the diagram, offering an almost complete description of the failure in one simple illustration.

The pictographs are simple drawings intended to convey a straightforward, instantly recognizable summary of the type of failure that has occurred. Using detailed illustrations such as excerpts from design blueprints or combinations of computer icons is not permitted as the extra detail tends to blur and delay understanding.

Finally, a note on searching the Failure Knowledge Database. Traditional database search methods employ inverted tree logic in an enumerative method, but the system used in the Failure Knowledge Database allows the user to search using terms that are of direct consequence to the user's understanding of a failure case study and reason for searching for that knowledge (i.e., for use in preventing future failures).
We have also found that using words only as search terms is not always the most efficient way of searching, and for this reason we have found it extremely useful to include a pictograph in the list of search results. This means that, if a particular search produces a large number of results, it is possible to determine which case studies are relevant by glancing at pictures rather than by reading numerous lines of text. We also believe that it is very important to be able to show the diagonal scenario and pictograph in the same window.